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Malcolm Brown has done a great service for those interested in Lawrence’s
ideas by including them here.
In conclusion, this is a superb addition
to the literature on guerrilla warfare. I
enjoyed reading it. Lawrence’s prose
and clarity of thinking and exposition
made it doubly enjoyable.
AHMED HASHIM

Naval War College

Symonds, Craig L. Decision at Sea: Five Naval Battles That Shaped American History. New York:
Oxford Univ. Press, 2005. 378pp. $30

What history buff could possibly resist
the subtitle “Five Naval Battles That
Shaped American History”? Those so
enticed will not be disappointed in
Craig Symond’s exceptionally well written and fascinating accounts of these
American naval battles: Oliver Hazard
Perry’s far-reaching victory over the
British in the 10 September 1813 battle
for Lake Erie; the 8–9 March 1862 battle of Hampton Roads (which ended in
a draw) between America’s first ironclad ships, USS Monitor and CSS Virginia; the 1 May 1898 battle of Manila
Bay; the 4 June 1942 battle of Midway;
and the 18 April 1988 Operation PRAYING MANTIS in the Persian Gulf.
Because the American navy was absent,
Symonds does not list the most crucial
naval battle in American history, the
early September 1781 battle of the
Capes, in which a French fleet prevented the British from resupplying
Lord Charles Cornwallis’s besieged
troops at Yorktown. Nonetheless, he
provides a detailed account of this battle, describing it as “the battle that

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2007

C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Winter 2007.vp
Wednesday, February 28, 2007 8:14:50 AM

secured American independence.”
Symonds places special emphasis on
crucial command decisions. In this
case, he notes, for example, that at a
critical moment the British commander, Rear Admiral Thomas Graves,
hoisted a flag signal whose ambiguity
resulted in failure to concentrate the
fleet’s fire on the French, who in large
measure prevailed because of this
blunder.
This book’s considerable historical
value resides as much in Symonds’s
highly interesting and detailed description of the British background as in the
actual battles. For example, most of us
learned in school that impressment by
the British of American sailors into the
Royal Navy was the prime cause of war
in 1812—but I was surprised to read
here that some ten thousand were so
impressed. While we all knew about
Perry’s victory at Lake Erie and his famous report, “We have met the enemy
and he is ours,” few have a true idea of
its significance. In Symonds’s words,
“Perry’s victory secured the northwestern frontier for the United States”—the
threat that greatly concerned us.
Symonds’s descriptions of the conditions in which men fought at sea are
also masterful. This is especially so in
his comparison of the conditions on
sailing ships with those of the ironclads,
Monitor and Virginia.
Symonds notes that in terms of casualties Virginia inflicted before Monitor’s
arrival “the worst defeat in the history
of the United States Navy until Pearl
Harbor.” The episode clearly spelled the
end of an era in naval warfare. The lopsided 1898 victory over the Spanish at
Manila Bay, for its part, left the United
States “an acknowledged world power”

1

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

Naval War College Review, Vol. 60 [2007], No. 1, Art. 15

and an “empire.” The close-run victory
at Midway confirmed the primacy of
aircraft carriers and ensured U.S. control of the western Pacific. PRAYING
MANTIS was thrown in mainly to demonstrate that new U.S. weapons do
work—albeit, in this case, against a
rather feeble Iranian foe. Curiously,
Symonds fails to note that a few months
earlier, the battleship USS Iowa had dramatically demonstrated a far greater
peacekeeping capability than the extensive, missile-equipped fleet he described.
WILLIAM LLOYD STEARMAN

Secretary of the Navy’s Advisory Subcommittee on
Naval History

Divila, Tony, Marc J. Epstein, and Robert
Shelton. Making Innovation Work: How to Manage It, Measure It, and Profit from It. Upper Saddle
River, N.J.: Wharton School, 2006. 334pp. $29.99

Innovation is one of the four pillars of
the U.S. Defense Department’s Transformation Plan. Innovation has nudged
its way into the mission statements and
strategies of most business and government organizations, because it is essential for competitive positioning and
sustained performance. Yet in spite of
executive proclamations and substantial
investment, a majority of organizations
report disappointing innovation results.
Making Innovation Work does a thorough job of converting the concept of
innovation into a practical management framework. Although the book is
research-based and two of its authors
are academics, it provides practical
tools and techniques for managing the
end-to-end innovation process. It also
debunks several innovation myths, such
as creativity and management discipline
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being incompatible. Examples and vocabulary are clearly geared to a business
audience. There are several excellent
books on military innovation, but most
are analytical and retrospective. This is
a “hands on” book about the management of innovation, and leaders of national security organizations will
appreciate the relevance of the book’s
framework.
This book is geared to leaders who
manage innovation in large successful
organizations. Paradoxically, large successful organizations typically have the
weakest innovation results, because innovation requires deviation from the
practices and technology that have
served them so well over the years. At
times the book becomes a bit repetitive,
and word or phrase usage can become
confusing, but the liberal use of graphics and text boxes to deliver important
insights, examples, and models is quite
effective.
The authors’ innovation model is a
four-cell matrix. The two axes (Technology, Business Model) are subdivided
into “New” and “Existing.” The four
cells categorize distinct types of innovation, labeled “Incremental,” “Business
Model Semi-Radical,” “Technology
Semi-Radical,” and “Radical.” An innovation project utilizing existing technology but employing a new way of
conducting business is categorized as
“Semi-Radical.” An example is iPod/
iTunes, which uses existing technology
but dramatically alters the way music is
acquired. This type of product is called
a “disruptive innovation.” It fundamentally changes the marketplace and
the organization’s competitive position
in it. The authors’ premise is that the
category of innovation is an important
consideration, since it sets the stage for
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